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The Effect of Motherhood on Wages and Wage Growth:  
Evidence for Australia 
 
Abstract 
Labour market theory provides several reasons why mothers are likely to earn lower 
hourly wages than non-mothers. However, the size of any motherhood penalty is an 
empirical matter and the evidence for Australia is limited. This paper examines the 
effect of motherhood on Australian women’s wages and wage growth using a series of 
panel-data models which control for other relevant factors, both observed and 
unobserved. Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) survey, an unexplained motherhood wage penalty of around four per cent for 
one child, and eight per cent for two or more children, is found. Further analysis 
suggests that the wage penalty emerges over time through reduced wage growth, rather 
than through an immediate wage decline after the birth of a child. This reduction in 
wage growth is consistent with discrimination but also with a reduction in mothers’ 
work effort.   
 
I. Introduction 
A large body of international literature has studied whether mothers earn lower 
wages than non-mothers. A significant wage penalty has been found in the United 
States1, Britain (Waldfogel, 1995; 1998a), Canada (Drolet, 2002) and Germany 
                                                 
1 Such as: Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002; 2003), Baum (2002), Budig and England (2001),  
Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009), Lundberg and Rose (2000), Taniguchi (1999) and Waldfogel (1997; 
1998a).  
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(Buligescu et al., 2009).2 However, studies in Denmark (Gupta and Smith, 2002) and 
Sweden (Albrecht et al., 1999) have found motherhood or maternal leave to have no 
direct effect on wages, so the evidence is mixed.  
Although the effects of children on wages may work indirectly by affecting the 
mother’s work experience, job tenure, education and job choices, most studies focus on 
estimating the direct effect of children. To that end, a motherhood penalty is typically 
estimated with the characteristics of the woman and her job, and sometimes time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, held constant. In studies which have found such a 
penalty, estimates range from two per cent (Baum, 2002; Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 
2009) to nine per cent (Waldfogel, 1995; 1998a) for one child and a further two 
(Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; 2003) to nine per cent (Budig and England, 2001) 
for additional children.  
In contrast to the large international literature, the effect of motherhood on wages 
or wage growth has received little attention in Australia. In fact, only two Australian 
studies (Krepp, 2007; Whitehouse, 2002) have sought to examine whether mothers earn 
lower hourly wages than non-mothers, and no Australian study to date has examined the 
effect of motherhood on wage growth. Using cross-sectional data from the Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in 1995, Whitehouse (2002) found no significant 
effect of dependant children on Australian women’s wages. Similarly, Krepp (2007) 
found no wage penalty using a Heckman-corrected cross-sectional model to account for 
selection into employment. Although these Australian studies have found no direct 
                                                 
2 Most studies which found a motherhood wage penalty control for marital status in their analysis (for 
example, Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; 2003; Baum, 2002; Budig and England, 2001). This 
indicates that motherhood has a negative effect on wages, independent of the effects of marriage.  
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effect of motherhood on wages, their results are potentially biased by unobserved 
heterogeneity and the omission of key controls.3  
Understanding the effect of children on women’s wages and wage growth is 
important to current Australian policy. The policy options for counteracting the fiscal 
effects of an ageing population  include increasing birth rates whilst maintaining high 
levels of female labour force participation (LFP) (Australian Treasury Department, 
2007). However the success of such a policy depends upon the extent to which the 
presence of children affects mothers’ wages, which in turn affect LFP.   
The effect of motherhood on wages is also important to the study of gender wage 
equality. The direct and indirect effects of children are often cited as a cause of the 
gender wage gap, so measuring the motherhood wage differential will shed light on this 
hypothesis (Waldfogel, 1998b).  
Finally, the opportunity costs born by mothers are of social importance. If good 
parenting provides positive externalities to the community, it can be argued that ‘good’ 
mothers disproportionately incur the costs of childbearing (Budig and England, 2001),  
which include not only the explicit costs of food, clothing, health, education and shelter  
but also the implicit costs of wages foregone.  
Given the importance of the issue to policy and the paucity of prior Australian 
research, this paper contributes to the literature by examining whether Australian 
mothers, on average, earn lower hourly wages than non-mothers. Fixed-effects 
estimates of the motherhood penalty, which are robust to time-invariant unobserved 
                                                 
3 In Whitehouse’s model, the coefficient of motherhood may be biased towards zero by the omission of 
experience if mothers in the sample are older than non-mothers, as the two categorical age variables 
included may not successfully control for the effect of aging on experience. Similarly, Krepp’s models do 
not control for part-time employment status; if mothers are more likely to work part-time jobs, and part-
time work attracts a pay premium (Booth and Wood, 2008), the motherhood coefficient may be biased 
towards zero. Although Krepp accounts for selection into employment, her estimates may be biased by 
other unobserved factors correlated with both motherhood and wages (Anderson, Binder and Krause, 
2002; 2003; Korenman and Neumark, 1992). 
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factors, are obtained using an unbalanced panel from the first eight waves of the 
Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey.4 The fixed-
effects results are compared with OLS and Heckman-corrected estimates, calculated 
with pooled cross-sectional data, to gauge the extent of heterogeneity and selection bias.  
Whether the motherhood wage differential arises immediately after birth, or 
develops over time through wage growth is also investigated. The first-difference and 
first-difference with fixed-effects models of Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009), which 
account for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on both the wage level and wage 
growth, are estimated using the Australian data. The results consistently show that the 
wage penalty is a result of slower wage growth.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the 
theoretical reasons for a motherhood wage penalty and reviews the empirical literature. 
Section III presents the empirical approach adopted in this paper and Section IV 
describes the HILDA data and the sample used to estimate the models. Finally, 
Section V presents the empirical results and Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Theoretical Background 
Economic theory provides a number of non-mutually exclusive reasons why a raw 
wage penalty between mothers and non-mothers may exist. The main reason is the 
greater frequency and duration of work interruptions among mothers, which may reduce 
                                                 
4 The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and is managed by the Melbourne 
Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (MIAESR). The findings and views reported in this 
paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to either FaHCSIA or the MIAESR. 
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wages through foregone work experience, depreciation of skills and loss of tenure.5 The 
anticipation of work interruptions may also slow wage growth if it induces lower 
investment in human capital (Ben-Porath, 1967).6 
The propensity of mothers to seek employment offering flexibility, part-time 
hours, maternity-leave entitlements or limited travel time may also result in lower 
wages as a compensating differential (Rosen, 1986). Part-time work explains a large 
portion of the motherhood wage penalty in the United States (Waldfogel, 1997) and 
Britain (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999), however Australian studies of part-time 
wages (Booth and Wood, 2008; Rodgers, 2004) suggest that part-time work may not 
directly cause (or increase) a motherhood wage penalty. Nevertheless, working part 
time may still affect Australian mothers’ wages in the long run if they accumulate less 
work experience and have fewer opportunities for promotion (Abhayaratna et al., 2008). 
The effort required to raise children may also reduce mothers’ wages according to 
Becker’s (1985) ‘worker effort’ hypothesis (Budig and England, 2001). Furthermore, 
even if mothers and non-mothers are equally productive, a wage  penalty may arise 
through statistical discrimination if employers believe childcare and housework 
responsibilities make mothers less productive (Hyclak, Johnes and Thornton, 2005, 
p.384). It is also possible that employers with a prejudice against mothers will pay a 
wage below productivity by an amount sufficient to compensate for their taste for 
discrimination (Becker, 1957).   
Even in the absence of any direct or indirect effect of children on wages, a 
motherhood wage penalty may be observed in OLS models if there are unobserved 
factors, such as work motivation, which are negatively correlated with the desire for 
                                                 
5 See Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002; 2003), Baum (2002), Budig and England (2001), Hill (1979), 
Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel (1999), Lundberg and Rose (2000), and Waldfogel (1995; 1997). 
6 This effect is accentuated for mothers who expect to work part-time hours following the birth of a child. 
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children, and positively correlated with wages. On the other hand, the effect of 
motherhood on wages will be underestimated if those women most likely to experience 
a motherhood wage penalty are also the least likely to be employed. To account for 
some of these sources of bias, international studies have typically used panel data to 
estimate fixed-effects models (e.g. Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; 2003; Budig 
and England, 2001; Lundberg and Rose, 2000).  
A few studies have also addressed reverse causality between motherhood and 
wages with instrumental variables methods. This paper does not account for reverse 
causality as potential instruments are either not available in the Australian data or not 
possible given the sample size.7 The direction of possible reverse causality bias is not 
entirely clear. The motherhood penalty may be overstated if those women with lower 
wages, and hence a lower opportunity cost of leaving the workforce, are more likely to 
become mothers (Lundberg and Rose, 2000, p.692). Alternatively, higher wage rates 
may have an income effect that increases the probability of having a child (Ariza and 
Ugidos, 2007).  
 
III. Empirical Approach 
Initially, women’s wages are assumed to be determined according to the human 
capital model: 
                                                 
7 Instruments used in the motherhood penalty literature include father’s and mother’s education, whether 
the woman lived with her parents in adolescence (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2005; Neumark and 
Korenman, 1994), the parent’s educational goals for the woman, whether the woman’s mother worked at 
age 14, the number of siblings (Neumark and Korenman, 1994; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006), the 
woman’s past attitudes and her mother’s family history (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999). Instruments 
used in studies of motherhood and other labour market outcomes include state and county indicators of 
the cost of fertility and fertility control and laws on pregnancy termination (Klepinger, Lundberg and 
Plotnick, 1999), miscarriage (Hotz, Williams McElroy and Sanders, 2005), sex-mix of the first two 
children (Angrist and Evans, 1998) and twin births (Jacobsen, Wishart Pearce and Rosenbloom, 1999).  
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itit4it3it2it1it2it1it uYearMSJCHC2Child1ChildWln +ϕ+γ+γ+γ+γ+β+β+η=  
where lnWit is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage (in 2008 dollars) of woman i 
(i=1,2,…,N) in year t (t=1,2,…,T); Child1it and Child2it are dummy variables equal to 
one if the woman has one or more children (and has a valid wage rate), and two or more 
children respectively; HCit is a vector of human capital variables, namely, work 
experience, experience squared, education and tenure with the current employer; JCit is 
a vector of job characteristics, namely, part-time and casual employment status, 
industry, occupation, sector, firm size and union membership; MSit is a vector of 
dummy variables representing marital status, namely, partnered and separated; Yeart  is 
a vector of year dummies; ϕi is an individual specific intercept; and uit is a random error 
term.  
To remove the individual specific intercepts, ϕi, and hence control for time 
invariant unobserved characteristics, the variables in Equation 1 are time-demeaned, 
facilitating fixed-effects estimates of the motherhood wage differential. A significantly 
negative (positive) estimate of β1 indicates that there is a motherhood wage penalty 
(premium). Since Child1it and Child2it are equal to one if the woman has one or more 
children and two or more children respectively, the coefficient β2 gives the incremental 
effect of a second child. 
To understand whether the wage differential arises immediately after birth or 
develops over time through wage growth, a methodology similar to that of Loughran 
and Zissimopoulos (2009, pp.331-333) is employed. Modifying Equation 1 we obtain: 
iti
2
ititi
it5t4it3it2it1
it4it3it2it1it
uExpExp
GapYearMSJCHC
2YChild1YChild2Child1ChildWln
+ϕ+ϑ+α+
γ+γ+γ+γ+γ+
β+β+β+β+η=
 
[1] 
[2] 
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where HCit represents education and tenure, with experience (Expit) and the quadratic in 
experience (Expit2) included separately. In addition to Child1it and Child2it two variables 
YChild1it and YChild2it are included which count the number of years since returning to 
the workforce after giving birth to the first and second child respectively (equal to one 
in the first year of return to work after birth).8 Moreover, Gapit, which measures the 
number of years not in the labour force around the first and second births, is included to 
capture the effect of human capital depreciation.9  
In this specification, motherhood is allowed to affect both wage levels and wage 
growth. The immediate effect on the wage level in the first year of work after giving 
birth is given by 
st1
531 Gap×γ+β+β  for the first child and the incremental effect of a 
second child is given by
nd2
542 Gap×γ+β+β . The effect of the birth on subsequent 
annual wage growth is given by β3 for a first child and β4 gives the incremental effect of 
additional children. As well as allowing the wage equation to have separate intercepts 
(ϕi) the above model also allows different slopes in experience (αi) for each individual, 
enabling individual specific unobserved factors to affect both wage levels and wage 
growth.  
By taking first differences of each variable and assuming that experience increases 
by one every year, we obtain:10  
                                                 
8 Instead of constructing first differences of YChild1 and YChild2 and dividing by the number of years 
between interviews, this paper follows Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) in using the conceptually 
equivalent Child1 and Child2 variables instead. Child1 and Child2 are the more reliable measure as the 
information required to construct YChild1 and YChild2 is not available in the general release HILDA 
data. 
9 For women who gave birth and had an employment break, Gapit is set equal to the number of waves not 
working, and remains at this value in the years thereafter. The coefficient γ5is constrained to be the same 
for first and second children. 
10 In the panel used by Loughran and Zissimopolous, individuals are not observed every year so 
experience does not necessarily increase by one between observations. To account for this, Loughran and 
Zissimopoulos re-introduce the square of experience in Equations 3 and 4 and divide the change in the log 
wage, experience and experience squared by the time elapsed between the respondent’s interviews. 
Instead of diverging from the specifications, the sample and experience measure used in this paper to 
10 
 
ititi
it5t4it3it2it1
it4it3it2it1it
uExp
GapYearMSJCHC
2Child1Child2Child1ChildWln
Δ+δ+α+
Δγ+Δγ+Δγ+Δγ+Δγ+
β+β+Δβ+Δβ=Δ
                 
 
where ϑ=δ 2 . The time invariant ϕi has been removed, however the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity on wage growth, αi, remains. This allows for the possibility 
that wages have different growth rates over time for different individuals. If unobserved 
productivity traits such as career motivation are positively correlated with wage growth 
and also induce women to delay or forego childbearing, coefficients β1 to β4, will be 
negatively biased. Similarly, if there are unobserved factors which increase wage 
growth and induce women to become mothers β1 to β4 will be positively biased.  
Time-demeaning Equation 3 eliminates αi, obtaining a first-difference with 
fixed-effects model: 
)uu()ExpExp(
)GapGap()YearYear(
)MSMS()JCJC()HCHC(
)2Child2Child()1Child1Child(
)2Child2Child()1Child1Child(WlnWln
itititit
itit5tt4
itit3itit2itit1
itit4itit3
itit2itit1itit
Δ−Δ+−δ+
Δ−Δγ+Δ−Δγ+
Δ−Δγ+Δ−Δγ+Δ−Δγ+
−β+−β+
Δ−Δβ+Δ−Δβ=Δ−Δ
 Estimation results will be presented for Equation 1 (as a pooled cross-section 
and with fixed effects), Equation 3 (first-difference) and Equation 4 (first-difference 
with fixed effects). 
 
IV. Data 
The wage equations are estimated using unit-record data from the first eight 
waves (2001-2008) of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
                                                                                                                                               
estimate Equations 3 and 4  is constructed in such a way to ensure that experience increases by one 
between wage observations. In doing so, it is not necessary to include any additional variables in 
Equations 3 or 4, or to divide any variables by the time between interviews.   
 
[3] 
[4] 
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(HILDA) survey.11 Over the eight waves of HILDA, a total of 10,121 responding 
women were surveyed resulting in 54,490 woman-year observations.12  
To estimate the effect of motherhood on wages (Equation 1), the sample is 
restricted to women between the ages of 21 and 52 (see Table 1).13 Since each woman-
year observation must have a valid wage rate, 8,146 observations in which a woman 
was unemployed or out of the labour force were dropped. Other observations were 
excluded if the woman was self-employed, in full-time education, or had missing or 
inconsistent data.14 Furthermore, outlying wage observations in the top or bottom 0.5 
per cent of the remaining sample were excluded.15 After applying all restrictions, a 
sample of 4,476 women (2,731 with one or more children in at least one wave, 2,103 
with two or more children) making 17,012 woman-year observations was obtained 
(Sample A). Descriptive statistics for Sample A are provided in Table 2. 
    [Table 1 about here.] 
    [Table 2 about here.] 
To estimate Equations 3 and 4, the change in each variable between the years a 
woman is working must be constructed. To ensure that experience changes by 
(approximately) one year between consecutive wage observations (as required to obtain 
                                                 
11 Definitions of the variables used appear in Livermore (2009) and are available on request.   
12 For more information on the HILDA survey see Wooden and Watson (2007). 
13 Women aged 21 years or less were excluded as wage rates of young workers are generally determined 
by junior pay rate scales and as such do not reflect individual worker productivity. Women older than the 
usual childbearing age-range were also dropped. Inspection of the HILDA data shows that pregnancy 
rates fall greatly beyond the age of 45. To allow a woman aged close to 45 to have a child in the first 
wave of HILDA and be included in the sample in the waves that follow, only women aged 52 years or 
older were excluded. 
14 The self-employed were excluded as their wages are not determined in the same way as employees. 
Full-time students were excluded as their decisions about occupations and wage contracts are likely to 
differ from individual’s no longer in full-time education. Observations were excluded if the woman 
currently has a total number of children in excess of the total number she ever gave birth to or adopted. 
This should not occur as foster and step children are not counted as ‘children currently have’ in HILDA. 
Women with deceased children were also dropped as they may have wage effects stemming from 
childbearing and rearing in the past. Therefore, they may differ from women who have never had 
children. Observations with missing data on salary or hours worked, human capital, job characteristics or 
marital status were excluded.  
15 Testing revealed the results are generally insensitive to the wage cut-off chosen, and changing the wage 
cut-off has little effect on the conclusions drawn.  
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Equation 3) first-differences are not taken over non-responding years. Instead, ‘blocks’ 
of consecutive years are identified where a woman was working and had a valid wage 
observation or was not employed.16 To be included in the sample, each woman must 
have a valid block of responding years encompassing at least three wage observations to 
allow first-differences to be constructed, and the first-difference with fixed-effects 
model to be estimated.17 Excluding outlying wage growth observations where the ratio 
of consecutive wages exceeded a factor of 1.5, a final sample of 2,420 women making 
9,397 woman-year observations remained (1,576 with one or more children in at least 
one wave, 1,225 with two or more children). In this sample, a total of 161 first births 
and 114 second births were observed (Sample B).18 
 
V. Empirical Results19 
In the absence of controls, Child1 and Child2 in Equation 1 are not statistically 
significant) (Table 3).20 However, as mothers in the sample are older, and consequently 
have more years of experience than non-mothers, a significant eight per cent penalty 
arises when controlling for experience. The penalty becomes small (around two per 
cent) and insignificant when controlling for education and tenure. There continues to be 
no significant difference between mothers’ and non-mothers’ wages until controls are 
                                                 
16 This method should ensure that for the women in the sample, experience does not increase in the years 
no wage is observed. 
17 To make full use of the data, additional second blocks were identified. 82 women have 2 valid blocks 
(Waves 1-3 and Waves 5-7). First differences are only taken within each block, that is, not across waves 5 
and 3. 
18 That is, any wage which increased by more than 50 per cent or decreased by more than one third was 
excluded. This corresponds to a change in the natural log of the hourly wage of ± 0.405. As discussed in 
Section VI, the results are sensitive to outlying wage growth observations.  
19 Full results for all the models are reported in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
20 All models presented are un-weighted. There are no appropriate probability weights available for an 
unbalanced panel (using fixed-effects and first-difference estimation). Applying cross-sectional 
responding person weights to the pooled cross-sectional model has little effect on the estimates (results 
available on request).  
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included for marital status. In the final model, there remains a significant wage penalty 
of 3.0 per cent for one child, and a slightly smaller incremental penalty for an additional 
child, which is also significant.  
    [Table 3 about here.] 
A Heckman-corrected wage model (Appendix A, Table A.1) shows significant 
evidence of selection bias, with the Heckman-corrected motherhood penalty estimate 
for one child larger (by around 2.8 percentage points) than the pooled OLS results.21 
This suggests that mothers who are most likely to suffer a wage penalty are less likely 
to be employed, and therefore failure to account for selection into employment will 
understate the true motherhood wage penalty.  
The fixed-effects estimates of Equation 1 in Table 3 show no significant 
motherhood penalty after controlling for human capital variables. However when part-
time and casual status are added, a significant 4.5 per cent penalty for one child, and 3.9 
per cent penalty for two or more children (significant at the ten per cent level) appears, 
reflecting the large premium to part-time employment for Australian women.22 This 
contrasts with results for Britain and the United States which found part-time work to be 
a source of the motherhood penalty (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999, Waldfogel, 
1997).  
Including other job characteristics and marital status has little effect on the 
motherhood coefficient. With all controls included, the fixed-effects results show 
mothers with one child receive a 4.4 per cent penalty while mothers of two or more 
children earn around 8.1 per cent less than non-mothers on average, even after 
                                                 
21 A Heckman selection model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.542-543) was estimated with the pooled 
sample using maximum likelihood estimation. Non-labour income was used as an exclusion restriction 
following other studies (such as Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2005; Baum, 2002; Booth and Wood, 
2008; Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999; Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Krepp, 2007). Since self-
employed women are excluded from the sample, the selection correction accounts for selection into being 
an employee rather than employment in general. 
22 A part-time wage premium is in line with the findings of Booth and Wood (2008). 
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controlling for observable and time-invariant unobservable differences (Appendix A, 
Table A.1).23 These penalties are similar to the Heckman-corrected pooled estimates 
providing some evidence that selection into employment may be accounted for by fixed 
effects.  
This implies that mothers do not differ from non-mothers on unobservable productivity 
traits, other than those which affect selection into employment.  
The wage penalty is consistent with Becker’s (1985) ‘worker effort’ hypothesis 
whereby mothers have less energy to devote to work. Alternatively, motherhood may 
have no causal effect on productivity, yet a wage penalty arises through ‘taste’ 
discrimination or an (inaccurate) perception by employers that mothers are less 
productive.  
The penalty estimates are similar to some observed for the United States 
(Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Waldfogel, 1997; Waldfogel, 1998a)  but are larger than 
estimates for Denmark (Gupta and Smith, 2002) and other American results (Anderson, 
Binder and Krause, 2002; 2003; Budig and England, 2001), and smaller than results for 
Britain (Waldfogel, 1995; 1998a).24  
To determine whether the wage differential arises immediately after the birth of a 
child, or reflects the effect of motherhood on wage growth, Equations 3 and 4 have been 
estimated. The first-difference (FD) results reveal that having a first or second child has 
no immediate effect on the wage level (Table 4). Across all sets of control variables, the 
average effect of having a child in the first year of return to work is close to zero and 
                                                 
23 Additional fixed-effects models were estimated allowing for interaction between motherhood and 
professional occupation, partnered and part-time status. The results are not  included in this paper because 
none of the interaction terms were significant, suggesting that the motherhood penalty is not statistically 
different across marital, part-time work and professional occupation status. 
24 This result stands in contrast to prior Australian studies which found no significant motherhood wage 
penalty (Krepp, 2007; Whitehouse, 2002). The difference does not appear to be due to unobserved 
heterogeneity as a significant motherhood wage penalty was also found in the pooled cross-sectional 
model. As such, the contrasting results are likely to be due to differences in the way mothers are defined, 
sample composition, the time periods covered and the controls included in the models. 
15 
 
not statistically significant. Contrary to prior expectations of a negative effect, the 
coefficient of Gap is not statistically different from zero. 
    [Table 4 about here.] 
In contrast, the coefficient of YChild1 shows that having a first child significantly 
reduces wage growth. After the birth of a first child, annual wage growth is reduced by 
1.2 percentage points (p=0.012). The coefficient of YChild2 shows an offsetting positive 
effect of a second child on wage growth that borders on statistical significance 
(p=0.054). Altogether, the first-difference model suggests that the wage differential 
between mothers and non-mothers has come about through a reduction in wage growth, 
rather than an immediate fall in the wage level after birth. Loughran and 
Zissimopoulos (2009) found the opposite result for the United States; they found 
motherhood reduces wages by two per cent in the year of birth, and has no significant 
effect on subsequent wage growth.  
The first-difference with fixed-effects (FD-FE) model was estimated to account 
for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on wage growth (Table 5). The immediate 
effects of motherhood on the wage level are nonsignificant, small and very similar to 
those estimated in the FD models. However, allowing for individual slopes in 
experience increases the estimated effect of motherhood on wage growth. The point 
estimates imply that having a first child reduces wage growth by 3.1 per cent per year. 
In both the FD and FD-FE results, the effect of motherhood on wage growth is largely 
confined to mothers of only one child. The effect of having 2 or more children 
(compared to childlessness) on wage growth is the sum of the coefficients of Ychild1 
and Ychild2. In all models considered, this sum is close to zero. 
    [Table 5 about here.] 
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The larger effect of motherhood on wage growth in the FD-FE model may be due 
to the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on wage growth, which is only controlled for 
in the latter model. A comparison of the coefficients suggests that those women with 
wage-growth enhancing unobserved traits are more likely to have a first child, but less 
likely to have a second. However, the discrepancy may just reflect the lower precision 
in the FD-FE models. In any case, the FD-FE results strongly suggest that the 
(significant) FD estimates are not simply a result of a bias due to high skill women 
opting out of motherhood. If anything, the magnitude of the wage growth effects are 
underestimated in the FD models.     
The magnitude (and significance) of the estimates is somewhat sensitive to the 
criteria for excluding outlying wage observations (see Table A.2). However, the key 
results are not qualitatively sensitive to the exclusion criteria, nor to the choice of model 
(FD vs FD-FE).      
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
Holding observable and unobservable differences constant, fixed-effects estimates 
reveal mothers with one child earn around four per cent less than non-mothers on 
average, with a further four per cent penalty for a second child. This residual wage 
penalty may be due to actual productivity differences if responsibility for children 
leaves mothers with less energy to exert at work. Alternatively, mothers may be paid 
less than non-mothers because employers perceive mothers to be less productive or have 
a ‘taste’ for discriminating against them. Policies which help mothers balance work and 
family, such as greater access to childcare services, are likely to improve Australian 
mothers’ wages relative to that of non-mothers. 
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The first-difference results (Equation 3) show that a first or second child has no 
immediate effect on wages in the first year of returning to work, but a first child reduces 
subsequent wage growth by over one percentage point per annum. The first-difference 
with fixed-effects results (Equation 4), whilst less precise, demonstrate that the effect of 
a first child on wage growth is not simply the result of bias due to high skill women 
opting out of motherhood, and imply that the effect of a first child on wage growth may 
be considerably larger (around 3 percentage points per annum).  
These results are consistent with Australian maternity leave legislation which 
entitles most women to return to their prior position with their pre-birth employer, and 
thus wages may be unaffected in the short-term. However subsequent wage growth may 
be reduced if the presence of children reduces mothers’ actual or perceived productivity, 
or if employers have a taste for discrimination. 
Furthermore, the significant effects on wage growth are confined to mothers of 
only one child. The most plausible explanation for this surprising result is that having 
only one child is acting as a proxy for the presence of young infants. In our models, the 
effect of one child on wage growth is identified by wage changes amongst mothers with 
one child only. This child is usually young, since most mothers have a second child 
fairly soon after the first. In contrast, the incremental effect of a second child is 
identified by all women with two or more children and a small fraction of these children 
are infants. This explanation is consistent with the simpler models which find the 
incremental effect on wages of a second child to roughly equal the effect of a first child. 
More research is warranted to investigate this further as additional waves of HILDA 
data become available.     
Future research might also focus on estimating the motherhood penalty using 
instrumental variables techniques; as more waves of HILDA data become available, 
18 
 
instruments such as sibling sex-mix may be feasible. A longer panel may also yield 
greater precision to the estimates, particularly for the first-difference with fixed-effects 
specification.
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APPENDIX A 
 Estimation Results 
TABLE A.1 
 Pooled OLS Pooled 
Heckman 
Fixed Effects First 
Difference 
First Difference 
with Fixed 
Effects 
Child1 -0.030* -0.058*** -0.044* -0.001 0.020 
YChild1    -0.012* -0.031 
Child2 -0.025* -0.027* -0.037 -0.023 -0.032 
YChild2    0.009 0.040 
Exp 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.066***   
Exp2/100 -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.000* -0.010 
Gap    0.022 0.017 
Post Grad 0.223*** 0.246*** 0.083 0.077 0.028 
Bachelor 0.176*** 0.199*** 0.053 0.066 0.021 
Diploma 0.084*** 0.099*** 0.017 0.046 0.033 
Certificate 0.021 0.034** 0.014 0.019 0.026 
Year 12 0.030* 0.043*** 0.018 0.053 0.056 
Tenure 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.001 0.001 
Part-time 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.103*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 
Casual 0.007 0.002 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 
Primary -0.015 -0.022 0.055 -0.004 -0.006 
Util/Mining 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.135** 0.030 0.015 
Manufacturing 0.061* 0.061* 0.025 0.004 -0.010 
Construction 0.048 0.049 0.035 0.003 -0.007 
Ret/Hosp -0.046* -0.049* -0.009 0.014 0.010 
Transport 0.062 0.065 0.010 0.026 0.030 
Culture 0.076** 0.076** 0.048 0.016 0.015 
Fin/Science 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.043 0.024 0.014 
Educ/Health 0.041 0.041 0.058* 0.045** 0.040* 
Manager 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.079*** 0.018 0.016 
Professional 0.289*** 0.287*** 0.096*** 0.017 0.016 
Trade 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.029 0.010 0.013 
Community 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.026 0.024 0.025 
Clerical 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.046* -0.003 -0.005 
Sales 0.084*** 0.086*** 0.010 -0.015 -0.021 
Machinery 0.050 0.043 0.068 0.024 0.022 
Private 0.064*** 0.068*** -0.010 -0.004 -0.001 
Public 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.014 -0.006 -0.008 
Small  -0.033** -0.033** -0.026* -0.006 -0.003 
Large  0.045*** 0.047*** 0.027** -0.002 -0.002 
Union 0.011 0.013 0.008 -0.003 0.001 
Partnered 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.042** -0.000 -0.005 
Separated 0.041** 0.037* 0.047* 0.002 -0.009 
Constant 2.443*** 2.368*** 2.119*** 0.054*** 0.219* 
R2 0.319  0.089 0.024 0.025 
F 89.27***  20.95*** 4.15*** 3.47*** 
N (Uncensored) 17,012 17,036 17,012 9,397 9,397 
N (Censored)  9,224    
Log L  -19274***    
λ   0.080    
ρ   0.249    
Wald 2χ   28.12***    
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-8.  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Year dummies are included in 
all models. Log L is the log pseudolikelihood. λ is the estimated inverse Mill’s ratio. ρ  is the estimated correlation 
between the wage and employment equation error terms. 2χ is the chi squared value from a Wald test of independence 
of the wage and selection equations ( 0 : 0H ρ = ).  
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TABLE A.2 
 Wage Growth Cut-off 
Observations with wage growth in excess of ± this were dropped 
 0.182 0.405 0.693 0.916 
First Difference (Equation 3) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 
YChild1 (β3) -0.000 -0.012
* -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
YChild2  (β4) -0.002 0.009 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
First Difference with Fixed effects (Equation 4) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 
YChild1 (β3) -0.018 -0.031 -0.063
** -0.048 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026) 
YChild2  (β4) 0.017 0.040 0.058
* 0.056 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.032) 
N (Total Observations) 6,544 9,397 10,479 10,728 
N (First Births) 95 161 192 197 
N (Second Births) 79 114 139 148 
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-8.  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
The dependant variable, the natural log of the hourly wage, and all regressors, are in first-difference form as 
specified in Equations 3 and 4.  All regressions include full controls and are unweighted.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Construction: Remaining Woman-Year Observations 
Sample A:  
Women 54 490 
Aged between 21 and 52 30 444 
Employed 22 298 
Employees (not self-employed) 19 605 
Not studying full time 18 934 
Not missing wage data  18 777 
Not an outlying wage 18 591 
Not inconsistent child data 18 511 
No deceased children 18 238 
Not missing human capital data 17 585 
Not missing job characteristic data 17 015 
Not missing marital status 17 012 
Sample B:  
Part of a valid block encompassing 3 or more wages  13 454 
Dropping the first observation from each block in making 
first differences 
10 922 
Ratio of consecutive wages no more than 1.5 9 397 
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-8. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample A 
Mother Non-Mother   Mother 
Non- 
Mother 
Hourly wage 23.35 23.54  Industry Continued    
Log-hourly wage 3.08 3.09 * Construction 0.04 0.04  
Age (years) 40.68 30.29 *** Retail/Hospitality 0.19 0.19  
Experience (years) 18.23 11.04 *** Transport 0.02 0.02  
Tenure (years) 6.11 4.35 *** Culture 0.03 0.06 *** 
Education    Finance/Science 0.11 0.20 *** 
Post-Graduate 0.10 0.14 *** Education/Health 0.49 0.37 *** 
Bachelor Degree 0.17 0.30 *** Other (Omitted) 0.02 0.03  
Diploma 0.10 0.13 *** Sector    
Certificate 0.17 0.12 *** Private Sector 0.56 0.62 *** 
Year 12 0.15 0.19 *** Public Sector 0.33 0.28 *** 
Year 11 (Omitted) 0.29 0.12 *** Other (Omitted) 0.11 0.10 * 
Occupation    Firm Size    
Manager 0.07 0.08 * Small  0.24 0.21 *** 
Professional 0.26 0.36 *** Medium (Omitted) 0.13 0.15 * 
Trade 0.04 0.05 *** Large 0.63 0.64  
Community 0.16 0.10 *** Other Job Characteristics    
Clerical 0.27 0.27  Part-time Worker 0.53 0.18 *** 
Sales 0.10 0.09  Casual Worker 0.26 0.17 *** 
Machinery 0.02 0.01 *** Union member 0.30 0.26 *** 
Labourer (Omitted) 0.09 0.05 *** Marital Status    
Industry    Partnered 0.80 0.48 *** 
Primary 0.01 0.01 *** Separated 0.15 0.03 *** 
Utilities/Mining 0.01 0.01 *** Never Married 0.04 0.49 *** 
Manufacturing 0.07 0.07  (Omitted)    
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-8. 
Notes: *,**,** means mothers and non-mothers are statistically different at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
levels of significance, respectively. Means are weighted by cross-sectional probability weights. 
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TABLE 3 
Pooled Cross-Section OLS 
N = 17012 (4476) No controls Experience 
Only 
+Education, 
tenure 
+Part-time, 
Casual Status 
+Industry, 
Occupation 
+Sector, Firm 
Size, Union 
Status 
+Marital Status 
(All Controls) 
Child1 -0.010 -0.077*** -0.024 -0.024 -0.017 -0.015 -0.030* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Child2 -0.004 -0.026 -0.011 -0.011 -0.019 -0.021 -0.025* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
R2 0.012 0.057 0.235 0.238 0.316 0.305 0.319 
F 20.25*** 49.41*** 119.77*** 110.87*** 90.44*** 93.76*** 89.27*** 
Fixed Effects 
N = 17012 (4476)        
Child1 0.021 0.014 0.014 -0.045* -0.044* -0.044* -0.044* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Child2 -0.037 -0.029 -0.028 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.037 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
R2 0.049 0.056 0.056 0.073 0.083 0.087 0.087 
F 50.14*** 47.29*** 31.62*** 36.91*** 23.76*** 21.79*** 20.95*** 
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-8.  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors are in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependant variable is the 
natural log of the hourly wage in constant 2008 dollars. All regressions correspond to Equation 1. Regressions are not weighted. Full results for final model 
reported in Table A.1, Appendix A. 
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TABLE 4 
First Difference  
N = 9397 (2420) 
No controls Experience 
Only 
+Gap +Education, 
tenure 
+Part-time, 
Casual 
Status 
+Industry, 
Occupation 
+Sector, Firm 
Size, Union 
Status 
+Marital 
Status 
(All Controls) 
Child1 (β1) 0.039
* 0.036* 0.024 0.024 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Child2 (β2) -0.008 -0.010 -0.022 -0.021 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Gap ( 5γ )   0.030 0.031 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 
   (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 
YChild1 (β3) -0.015
** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
YChild2 (β4) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Immediate Effect of Motherhood:         
First Child: 
st1
531 Gap×γ+β+β  0.023 0.023 0.029 0.030 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Second Child: 
nd2
542 Gap×γ+β+β  -0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.024 0.024 0.024 
F 2.28** 2.33** 2.33** 2.04** 6.48*** 4.84*** 4.33*** 4.15*** 
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-8  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors are in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependant variable, the natural log 
of the hourly wage, and all regressors, are in first-difference form as specified in Equation 3. Full results for final model are reported in Table A.1, Appendix A.  
 
27 
 
 
TABLE 5 
First Difference with Fixed Effects 
N = 9397 (2420) 
No controls Experience 
Only 
+Gap +Education
, tenure 
+Part-time, 
Casual 
Status 
+Industry, 
Occupation 
+Sector, Firm 
Size, Union 
Status 
+Marital Status 
(All Controls) 
Child1 (β1) 0.046
* 0.051* 0.040 0.040 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Child2 (β2) -0.026 -0.023 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Gap ( 5γ )   0.026 0.026 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 
YChild1 (β3) -0.025 -0.031 -0.030 -0.031 -0.029 -0.030 -0.030 -0.031 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
YChild2  (β4) 0.048
* 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.040 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Immediate Effect of Motherhood         
First Child 
st1
531 Gap×γ+β+β  
0.021 0.019 0.026 0.026 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Second Child 
nd2
542 Gap×γ+β+β  
0.023 0.020 0.026 0.026 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
R2 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.025 0.025 0.025 
F 1.34 1.37 1.41 1.27 5.07*** 3.99*** 3.61*** 3.47*** 
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-8  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors are in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependant variable, the natural log 
of the hourly wage, and all regressors, are in first-difference form as specified in Equation 4. Full results for final model are reported in Table A.1, Appendix A.  
 
